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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellant, :
v.

:

DEVON BOYD POTTER,

Case No. 920579-CA
Priority No. 10

t

Defendant-Appellee.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an interlocutory appeal from a trial court
order suppressing evidence in a prosecution for unlawful
possession of a controlled substance, Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i)(B) (Supp. 1992), and possession of drug paraphernalia,
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37a-5 (1990), both class B misdemeanors,
entered by the Seventh District Court, in and for Emery County,
Utah, the Honorable Bryce K. Bryner, presiding.

This Court

granted the State's interlocutory appeal petition by order dated
October 7, 1992. This Court has appellate jurisdiction under
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992), and Rule 26(3)(e),
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court erroneously suppress evidence

seized pursuant to a warrant-supported search of defendant's
home, based upon its ruling that no "exigent circumstances"
justified a warrantless, pre-search entry to secure the premises?

A trial court's "exigent circumstances" determination is reversed
on appeal only if it is clearly erroneous.

State v. Ashe, 745

P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987); State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 1194
(Utah App. 1991).

The question of whether suppression is the

remedy for an improper home entry, where the evidence was seized
independently from the entry, is one of law, reviewed without
deference to the trial court.

See Seoura v. United States, 468

U.S. 796, 799, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 3382 (1984).
2.

Did the trial court erroneously rule that the

search warrant, pursuant to which contraband was found in
defendant's home, failed the "particularity" requirement because
of an apparent error in describing defendant's home address?
This issue appears subject to nondeferential review for legal
error, examining the warrant, and the facts known to the
executing officers, to ascertain whether with reasonable effort,
the correct premises could be found.

See United States v. Burke,

784 F.2d 1090 (11th Cir.) (reversing suppression order under
"reasonable effort" analysis), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1174, 106
S. Ct. 2901 (1986).
3.

Did the trial court erroneously reject the State's

argument that even if the search warrant was defective, the "good
faith-reasonable reliance" exception to the exclusionary rule
should apply?

Once the underlying facts are established, the

issue of whether the "good faith-reasonable reliance" exception
might apply, permitting admission of evidence seized pursuant to
a subsequently-invalidated warrant, is considered a question of
2

law.

United States v. Russell, 960 F.2d 421, 423 (5th Cir.),

cert, denied,

U.S.

, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
reads:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
The text of any other pertinent constitutional provisions,
statutes, or rules will be contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant is charged with unlawful possession of a
controlled substance and unlawful possession of drug
paraphernalia, both class B misdemeanors (R. I). 1 The evidence
supporting the charges includes, among other things, apparent
leaf marijuana and "roaches" from marijuana cigarettes, as well
as a hemostat, a "roach clip," and triple beam scales (R. 9).
These items were seized during a warrant-authorized search of
defendant's trailer home (R. 8).
Defendant moved to suppress the above evidence, arguing
that the home search violated the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution (R. 34). However, neither in his supporting
Citations to the main record are designated "R."
The
evidentiary hearing of the motion to suppress is designated "T."

3

memoranda, nor in his oral argument of the suppression motion,
did defendant request or articulate a more rigorous analysis
under Article I, section 14, than under the fourth amendment (R.
127-44, 163-71; T. 78-82).
constitutional analysis.

He thus limited this case to federal
See State v. Brown,

Utah Adv. Rep.

/ No. 900148, slip op. at 4 n.l (Utah Nov. 30, 1992); State v.
Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1986); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d
1268, 1272-73 & n.5 (Utah App. 1990).2
Defendant alleged four specific deficiencies in the
search of his home:

(1) that no "exigent circumstances"

justified officer entry into his home prior to issuance of the
warrant; (2) that the warrant was not supported by probable
cause; (3) that the warrant affidavit contained recklessly false
statements; and (4) that the warrant did not satisfy the
"particularity" requirement in its description of the premises
(R. 129-30).

The State responded to all of defendant's

allegations (R. 150-59), and further argued that even if the
search warrant was somehow deficient, suppression of the evidence
should be avoided under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104
S. Ct. 3405 (1984), because the searching officers had reasonably
relied upon the warrant (R. 159-61).
The trial court's grant of the motion to suppress was
based upon only two of defendant's four supporting allegations.
2

The only state constitution-based rule cited by defendant was
the Utah Supreme Court's holding, in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d
460, 472 (Utah 1990), that the exclusionary rule applies to
violations of Article I, section 14, just as it does to Fourth
Amendment violations.
4

The court ruled, first, that "[e]xigent circumstances did not
exist to justify the officer's [sic] warrantless entry of
defendant's home."

Second, the court ruled that "[t]he search

warrant was defective in that it did not 'particularly' describe
the place to be searched" (R. 172). The court did not address
defendant's other allegations, nor did it address the State's
"reasonable reliance" argument.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The findings of fact underpinning the trial court's
suppression order (R. 172-74, copied at Appendix I of this brief)
are rather sketchy.

This fact recitation will track the trial

court's findings, fleshing them out as needed from the transcript
of the hearing on the motion to suppress.
The Warrantless Home Entry
At about 10:30 p.m. on a winter evening, an Emery
County sheriff's deputy stopped Leon Sandstrom for driving under
the influence, near defendant's Huntington, Utah trailer home (R.
172; T. 4-5, 8-9, 22-23, 28, 66). As the deputy asked him out of
the vehicle for field sobriety testing, the intoxicated Sandstrom
volunteered information that several men were then smoking
marijuana inside defendant's home (T. 9). 3
Sandstrom told the deputy that he had left defendant's
home because of the marijuana smoking; the vehicle he was
3

The trial court's finding that Sandstrom reported "seven
persons" smoking marijuana (R; 173) appears clearly erroneous:
only "several" or "some" marijuana smokers were reported (T. 9, 12,
43).
This error also found its way into the search warrant
affidavit (R. 13).
5

driving, Sandstrom said, belonged to a Jim Ward, who was then
present in defendant's home (T. 9). Sandstrom asked the deputy
if his information about the goings-on in defendant's trailer
home would "help him" regarding his likely DUI charge (T. 10).
The deputy contacted Tom Harrison, an Emery County
narcotics detective (T. 10-12, 41). Harrison came to the scene
of the stop and spoke with Sandstrom, who repeated his account of
marijuana smoking in defendant's trailer home, and claimed that
the smokers possessed a baggie containing "about three fingers"
of the aromatic weed (T. 42-43).
By this time several other law officers had arrived at
the scene, where Sandstrom's arrest, and the impoundment of the
vehicle driven by Sandstrom, were in progress (T. 11, 43).
Detective Harrison directed the officers to watch defendant's
home while he applied for a warrant to search it (T. 24-25, 4344).

While watching, and during the roughly forty-five minutes

used to complete Sandstrom's arrest and the vehicle impoundment,
the officers saw persons within defendant's home peering out
through its window and door several times (R. 173; T. 11, 13,
22).

A car also drove to the home, and then left, during this

interval (T. 18, 32-33)/

*That car, driven by defendant's brother, Wayne Potter, was
stopped, and contraband recovered from it.
Wayne Potter's
prosecution was stymied by the trial court's suppression of that
contraband, on the basis that the stop was improper.
That
suppression ruling is the subject of another State's appeal, State
v. Wayne D. Potter, No. 920614-CA, also pending in this Court.

6

The watching officers reported their observations to
Detective Harrison.

In turn, Harrison, on advice from the county

attorney who was helping him prepare the search warrant
affidavit, directed the officers to enter defendant's home, and
to secure it pending arrival of the search warrant (T. 13-17,
32).

The officers did so, and found defendant watching

television with his brother Willie (also known as Brett, T. 56),
and Jim Ward (T. 14, 66-68).

There is no indication that

criminal evidence was sought or seen at that time:

the home was

merely checked for other people, and secured (id.).
The Warrant
With the county attorney's help, Detective Harrison
prepared a search warrant affidavit (warrant and affidavit at R.
10-15, copied at Appendix II of this brief; T. 48-50).

The

affidavit recited Sandstrom's fresh report of marijuana smoking
inside defendant's home (R. 13). Harrison also asked to search
for proceeds and records of drug transactions (R. 12). These
were sought because other narcotics officers had reported that
defendant was a drug dealer (R. 14). Harrison also knew Jim
Ward, the owner of the vehicle driven by Sandstrom, to be a drug
abuser (id..; T. 59). At the hearing on the motion to suppress,
Harrison explained that before seeking the warrant, he was
already investigating defendant for narcotics offenses:
informants had told Harrison that defendant was a marijuana
dealer, and efforts to arrange a "controlled buy" from defendant
were in progress (T. 44).

7

Harrison presented his affidavit to a magistrate at
about 1:30 a.m. (R. 14; T. 50). The warrant was issued,
authorizing the search of defendant's trailer home.

On the

warrantf as on the affidavit, the home was described as "50 West
400 North, Black's Trailer Court, single wide trailer, second
trailer headed West on 400 N. on So. side of road, belonging to
DeVon Potter" (R. 10, 12, 173). The town, Huntington, was not
named (R. 173). It was subsequently established that the actual
street address of defendant's trailer was 7JL West 400 North;
further, his trailer was the third one in the described sequence
(R. 173; T. 52, 65).
It was also revealed that at some point—apparently
after defendant's home was secured but before the warrant was
obtained, Detective Harrison had briefly returned to the area,
and mistakenly knocked on the door of the wrong trailer home,
neither described in the warrant affidavit nor under any
investigation (T. 52-55).

Harrison had apologized to the

occupants of the mistakenly-approached home (T. 54-55, 58).
Later, warrant in hand, Harrison and the other officers
proceeded to search defendant's home (T. 56-58).

Tlie contraband

in question was seized, and this prosecution ensued.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's finding that no exigent circumstances
justified the pre-warrant entry of defendant's home was erroneous
because it was induced by an incorrect view of the law.
court found insufficient evidence that the sought-after

8

The

contraband would be destroyed if officers did not enter the
premises pending issuance of the search warrant.

However,

controlling authority, apparently disregarded by the trial court,
holds that exigent circumstances exist when it appears only that
contraband might be destroyed before a warrant can be obtained.
Even if the trial court was correct, suppression of the evidence
under its "no exigent circumstances" ruling is inappropriate, for
the seized contraband was not the fruit of the entry, but of the
subsequent, warrant-authorized search.
The trial court's ruling that the search warrant did
not satisfy the "particularity" requirement was erroneous because
it was based on incomplete legal analysis.

The court failed to

examine the warrant to determine whether, notwithstanding a
facial error in the address of the premises to be searched,
officers executing the warrant could nevertheless find the
correct premises with reasonable effort.

Such examination is

required under controlling law that accords with authority
presented to the trial court.
Finally, the trial court erroneously failed to analyze
whether, even if the search warrant was somehow defective, the
searching officers' reliance on it was reasonable.

Such analysis

is called for under federal authority that was briefed to the
trial court.

If satisfied, the reasonable reliance analysis

permits evidence to be admitted even if some flaw in a search
warrant is uncovered upon later review.
failing to perform that analysis here.

9

The trial court erred in

POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND "NO EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES" JUSTIFYING THE PRE-WARRANT
ENTRY OF DEFENDANT'S HOME; EVEN IF THE TRIAL
COURT WAS CORRECT, THE EVIDENCE WAS SEIZED
INDEPENDENTLY OF THE PRE-SEARCH ENTRY.
A trial court's "exigent circumstances" determination
is reversed on appeal only if it is clearly erroneous.

State v.

Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987); State v. Morck, 821 P.2d
1190, 1194 (Utah App. 1991).

Ashe was cited by the State in its

memorandum opposing defendant's motion to suppress (R. 150-52).
A.

The Trial Court Overstated the Degree of Proof of
"Exigent Circumstances."
In rejecting the State's contention that "exigent

circumstances" justified the pre-warrant entry and securing of
defendant's home, the trial court ruled that "there was no reason
to believe that the occupants of the home would destroy evidence
before a search warrant could be obtained" (R. 173, emphasis
added).

The emphasized term, "would," overstates the degree of

proof, set forth in Ashe, needed to show exigent circumstances.
Because it applied an incorrect legal standard of proof to the
question, the trial court's "no exigent circumstances" ruling was
clearly erroneous.

See State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah

1987) (quoting authority) (findings of fact are clearly erroneous
when they are "induced by an erroneous view of the law"); State
v. Svkes, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 39 (Utah App. Oct. 19, 1992)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (appellate court must examine whether
trial court applied the correct law in making its judgment).

10

In Ashe, the Utah Supreme Court comprehensively
examined the "exigent circumstances" exception to the warrant
requirement.

The court endorsed the exception for use in Utah

under circumstances quite similar to this case—a warrantless
entry into a home, where defendant, the home's occupant, had been
apparently alerted to a narcotics investigation.

So doing, the

supreme court noted that "[n]umerous cases have sustained
warrantless entries where the circumstances indicated that
evidence might be destroyed or removed if entry was delayed until
a warrant could be obtained."

745 P.2d at 1258 & n.10 (citing

cases) (emphasis added).
The foregoing passage correctly sets a reasonable
standard for finding exigent circumstances.

Certainty that

evidence would be lost pending issuance of a warrant is not
required; only a justifiable belief that evidence might be lost
is needed.

Accord State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1291 (Utah

App. 1988) ("One type of exigent circumstance . . . is when
preservation of the evidence might be endangered by the delay in
obtaining a warrant" (emphasis added), citing Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1835-36
(1966)).

This is an entirely appropriate approach, for one

hallmark of "exigency" is the existence of uncertainties:
officers must occasionally act without prior judicial
authorization, if only to stabilize a situation.
precisely what occurred here.

11

This is

Of course the officers could not know with certainty
that defendant would destroy or remove evidence before the search
warrant arrived.

However, occupants of defendant's home were

observed repeatedly peering outside, at the scene where Sandstrom
was stopped (R. 173; T. 11, 13, 22). While this behavior was
arguably consistent with innocent curiosity at the police
presence in the neighborhood (cj[. defendant's memorandum at R.
140-41), it was also consistent with a desire to keep tabs on the
police while hiding or disposing of any incriminating evidence on
the premises.
The police, aware that their presence was being
monitored, could not be reasonably certain that the evidence they
hoped to recover would still be in defendant's home by the time
the awaited search warrant arrived.

As in Ashe, 745 P.2d at

1260, such lack of certainty, arising through no fault of the
involved officers, justified the warrantless entry of defendant's
home.

Compare Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-65,

91 S. Ct. 2022, 2036 (1971), and State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460,
470 (Utah 1990) (no exigency existed where searched vehicles had
sat in same location for several days and there was no indication
that removal was imminent).

In fact, given that Sandstrom, when

stopped, had reported marijuana use then in progress, the
officers were justified in believing that the sought-after
contraband might quite literally go up in smoke, if they waited
to enter the home until the warrant arrived.

12

B.

The Officers Properly Limited the Intrusiveness of
the Pre-Search Entry.
True enough, a warrantless home entry should not be

lightly undertaken by police.

Cf. Northrup, 756 P.2d at 1290

(home entry is the "chief evil" restrained by the fourth
amendment (quoting federal Supreme Court cases)).

But here

again, the record shows that the police did not enter defendant's
home in disregard of this principle.

They did no more than they

were directed to do after reporting the apparent exigency to the
supervising officer and the county attorney; that is, they
entered and secured the premises. At that time, they neither
observed nor seized any evidence, in "plain view" or otherwise.
Compare State v. Rocha, 600 P.2d 543 (Utah 1979) (upholding
warrantless home entry pursuant to arrest, and seizure of
evidence in plain view).

Instead, the officers waited until they

obtained a warrant before undertaking the search that yielded the
evidence in question.
This was proper police conduct.

The officers obeyed

the constitutional imperative that a warrantless intrusion into a
private area must be "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies
which justify its initiation."

Mincev v. Arizona. 437 U.S. 385,

393, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2413 (1978) (home entry under exigent
circumstances) (quoting Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 25-26, 88 S.
Ct. 1868, 1882 (1968)); accord State v. Pursifull, 751 P.2d 825,
827 (Utah App. 1988).

Although not articulated to the trial

court, this principle should be reaffirmed, to guide police in
making on-the-spot decisions of the type that occurred here and,
13

equally important, to guide trial courts in the analysis of
motions to suppress evidence.

The limited-scope entry of

defendant's home was proper, and affords no basis for suppression
of the subsequently seized evidence•
C.

The Evidence Was Seized by Authority that Was
Independent from the Pre-Warrant Entry, and Is
Therefore Admissible,
In basing the suppression order on its finding of "no

exigent circumstances" to justify the initial home entry, the
trial court seemingly accepted defendant's argument that the
contraband seized pursuant to the subsequent, warrant-supported
search was subject to suppression as "fruit of the poisonous
tree" (defendant's rebuttal memorandum, at R. 137). Even if the
trial court correctly found "no exigent circumstances," it
committed legal error in accepting the "poisonous tree" argument.
In Seaura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S. Ct.
3380 (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that evidence
seized pursuant to a warrant was admissible, despite a prewarrant entry to the searched premises that was later found to be
unsupported by exigent circumstances.

So holding, the Court

reaffirmed the "independent source doctrine":
It has been well established for more than 60
years that evidence is not to be excluded if
the connection between the illegal police
conduct and the discovery and seizure of the
evidence is "so attenuated as to dissipate
the taint," . . . . It is not to be excluded,
for example, if police had an "independent
source" for discovery of the evidence.
468 U.S. at 805, 104 S. Ct. at 3385 (citations omitted).
Utah Supreme Court and this Court have adopted the Seaura
14

The

independent source doctrine for fourth amendment suppression
questions.

See State v. Kellv, 718 P.2d 385, 392 (Utah 1986);

State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1292-93 (Utah App. 1988).
As applied to a pre-warrant home entry followed by a
warrant-supported search, any Mtaint" from the pre-warrant entry
is dissipated when probable cause to issue the warrant is
supported by evidence separate and independent from that obtained
upon the entry.

Seaura, 468 U.S. at 799, 814, 104 S. Ct. at

3382, 3390; Kellv. 718 P.2d at 392 ("the sources of the warrants
were independently legal and unrelated to the impounding of the
house"); Northrup, 756 P.2d at 1293. This requirement was met
here:

the warrant affidavit set forth the facts known at the

time Sandstrom was stopped outside defendant's home, plus
Sandstrom's statements at that time (R. 12-14, Appendix II of
this brief).

Nothing learned upon the pre-warrant entry was used

to support the search warrant for defendant's home.5

Therefore,

under Sequra, Kellv, and Northrup, the evidence seized pursuant
to the warrant-supported search of defendant's home is
admissible, even if the pre-warrant entry was improper.

5

The pre-warrant entry did reveal evidence supporting the
search of defendant's brother's home, authorized in the same
warrant. An addendum to the warrant affidavit recited suspicious
activity by Willie Potter, while he was removing his dog from
defendant's home to his own nearby trailer home (R. 15, Appendix II
of this brief). However, only the search of defendant's home, not
Willie Potter's home, is at issue here.
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POINT TWO
THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS NOT VOID MERELY
BECAUSE OF THE FACIAL "PARTICULARITY" ERROR
IN ITS DESCRIPTION OF DEFENDANT'S HOME.
The trial court also erred in suppressing evidence
based upon its ruling that the search warrant, because of its
erroneous description of defendant's home, violated the fourth
amendment "particularity" requirement (R. 172). Opposing the
motion to suppress, the State cited United States v. Burke, 784
F.2d 1090 (11th Cir.), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1174, 106 S. Ct.
2901 (1986) (R. 159). That case held, "An erroneous description
of premises to be searched does not render a warrant invalid."
784 F.2d at 1092.

The trial court did not address this authority

in making its suppression ruling.
The Burke holding comports with Utah law which, in
turn, is consistent with federal Supreme Court law.

See Steele

v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 45 S. Ct. 414 (1925), followed in
State v. Anderson. 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985); State v.
Mclntire, 768 P.2d 970, 972-73 (Utah App. 1989).

Thus an

erroneous description of the place to be searched does not
automatically invalidate a warrant:

"It is enough if the

description is such that the officer with a search warrant can
with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place
intended."

Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1102 (quoting Steele, 267 U.S.

at 503, 45 S. Ct. at 416, and adding emphasis).
In undertaking the "reasonable effort" analysis,
reviewing courts look to the facts known by the warrant-serving
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officers, even if those facts are not recited in the warrant or
supporting affidavit.

Burke, 784 F.2d at 1092-93; cJE. Mclntire,

768 P.2d at 972 (refusing to suppress evidence where premises
were inaccurately described, where

,f

the record indicate[d]" the

place officers intended to search).

This approach properly

"limits the search to the confines contemplated by the magistrate
authorizing the warrant, while not invalidating searches because
of minor technical deficiencies in the warrant's description."
Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1103.
It further appears that a ruling invalidating a warrant
because of a "particularity" defect is reviewed nondeferentially
on appeal, as a matter of law.

Hence in Burke, the appellate

court reversed a trial court order suppressing evidence under the
above, "reasonable effort" analysis.
The "reasonable effort" analysis is satisfied here, for
despite the erroneous description of defendant's trailer home in
the warrant, the officers knew, all along, the correct location
of the home.

The officers kept defendant's home under constant

observation from the time Sandstrom volunteered the information
that illegal activity was going on within, until the search
actually occurred.

The failure to list the town as Huntington is

no more than a technical deficiency under Anderson, 701 P.2d at
1099, for clearly, the officers were not about to abandon
defendant's premises and seek out a similar address in another
town.

Additionally, the premises were described in the warrant

as "belonging to DeVon Potter," i.e., defendant (R. 12). The
17

particularity problem in the warrant, then, could not invalidate
it:

reasonable officers would have, and in fact did, locate the

correct premises.
Nor does the fact that Detective Harrison at one point
knocked on the door of the wrong home, one or two homes away from
defendant's, invalidate the warrant.

As Harrison's blunder, this

had nothing to do with the validity of the warrant:

"I don't

know why I went to the wrong trailer," he testified (T. 58).
Harrison's brief, apparently unreasonable mistake does not show
that the warrant here failed the "reasonable effort" test for
satisfaction of the particularity requirement.
In sum, the trial court failed to properly analyze
defendant's "particularity" challenge.

The court ended its

analysis prematurely upon finding a facial warrant defect, and
therefore erroneously invalidated the warrant.
POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ADDRESS
THE STATE'S "REASONABLE RELIANCE" ARGUMENT IN
OPPOSITION TO SUPPRESSION.
Finally, the trial court erred in disregarding the
State's argument that even if the search warrant were somehow
defective, the officers reasonably relied upon it, such that the
fruits of the search should not be suppressed.

The State cited

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), in
support of this argument (R. 160).
The Leon decision makes the point that exclusion of
relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding is "an extreme
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sanction."

468 U.S. at 916, 104 S. Ct. at 3417. While the

sanction is appropriate "where a Fourth Amendment violation has
been substantial and deliberate," 468 U.S. at 908-09, 104 S. Ct.
at 3413, its application is of dubious value where law officer
conduct is not deliberate.

After all, in the area of substantive

criminal law, punishment for a given harm will typically vary
according to the "mens rea" under which the accused is found to
have acted.

E.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201 through -206 (1990

and Supp. 1992) (defining and punishing types of homicide
according to accused's mental state).
Leon thus recognizes that officer error that is not
deliberate or extreme does not warrant the extreme sanction of
excluding relevant evidence seized pursuant to the error.
Further, consistent with the strong preference for warrants under
prevailing fourth amendment law, the Leon opinion seeks to
preserve the admissibility of evidence seized where law officers
do not act on their own, but rather, seek and obtain advance
judicial authorization, in the form of a warrant.

"In most such

cases, there is no police illegality and thus nothing to deter"
by suppressing the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant.

468

U.S. at 920-21, 104 S. Ct. at 3419. Accordingly, where the
officer "error" amounts to no more "objectively reasonable
reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant,"
suppression of evidence is not appropriate.
S. Ct. at 3420.

19

468 U.S. at 922, 104

Application of the Leon "reasonable reliance" exception
to suppression, once the underlying facts are established, is a
question of law.

United States v. Russell. 960 F.2d 421, 423

(5th Cir.), cert, denied.

U.S.

, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992).

Here, given the limited ground upon which it invalidated this
search warrant, the trial court erred in failing to consider
Leon.

The only ground for invalidating the warrant was the

"particularity" problem in describing the premises to be
searched—a ground that, as already shown, was erroneous.
However, the searching officers, again as already shown, and
quite reasonably, did not rely on the erroneous description of
the premises.

Their objectively reasonable nonreliance on the

faulty portion of the warrant, under Leon, weighs decisively
against suppression of the evidence.
Even assuming, without deciding, that defendant has a
plausible argument that the search warrant was unsupported by
probable cause, Leon would weigh against suppression, for the
officers reasonably relied on the warrant.

After all, the

existence of probable cause was a matter of disagreement between
the attorneys involved in this case.

The trial court, avoiding

the issue, thereby suggested its own uncertainty on the
question.6

Where these formally law-trained individuals could

not agree on the probable cause question, the police, with less

6

The trial court, however, should have recognized its
obligation to accord deference to the magistrate's probable cause
determination, under Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.
Ct. 2317, 2331 (1983), cited to the court (T. 83-84).
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training, cannot be faulted for relying upon the magistrate's
probable cause determination, and issuance of the warrant.

Once

more, the officers did not search defendant's home until the
neutral magistrate authorized them to do so:

this police conduct

should be upheld, not condemned.
Accordingly, the trial court should have held that,
despite possible error in the warrant, the officers conducted
this search in objectively reasonable reliance on it.

By failing

to acknowledge Leon, the trial court erred in ordering
suppression of the evidence seized from defendant's home.
CONCLUSION
The trial court failed to recognize and apply the
appropriate legal tests in deciding defendant's motion to
suppress.

Its suppression order was therefore erroneous, and

should be reversed.

This case should be remanded to the trial

court, with directions that the evidence seized pursuant to the
search warrant be admitted against defendant at trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this If

day of December, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

J. KEVIN MURPHY VJ
Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDIX I
Trial Court Ruling on Motion to Suppress

FILED
AUG 1 3 1992
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O l A ^ u r^r, - v.em
IN A N D F O R E M E R Y C O U N T Y , S T A T E OF~~UfSH

L

^~

^puty

THE STATE OF UTAH,
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
Plaintiff,
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
vs.
Criminal No. 91-CR-2650

DEVON BOYD POTTER,
Defendant,

Defendant's Motion to Suppress came on for Hearing on
September 16, 1991.

The Court heard the sworn testimony of the

witnesses and then took the matter under advisement after receiving Memorandum from the parties.
The Court finds that the evidence seized at the home of
the defendant should be suppressed for the following reasons:
A.

Exigent circumstances did not exist to justify the

officer's warrantless entry of defendant's home.
B.

The Search Warrant was defective in that it did not

"particularly" describe the place to be searched.
In arriving at this Ruling the court makes the following
Findings:
1. The informant Sandstrom was arrested near the defendant's
home on February 15, 1991 at approximately 10:30 p.m.

for a DUI,-

He was not stopped for any drug-related offense.

-I >ir*

-22.

Sandstrom, while intoxicated, volunteered a statement

to the arresting officer that seven persons were smoking marijuana
in defendant's house.
3.

Between the time of Sandstrom being stopped and the

entry into defendant's home (possibly as long as 45 minutes), persons peered out the window of defendant's home and were seen by the
officer who arrested Sandstroom.
4.

No evidence was presented which would suggest the per-

sons in the defendant's home had reason to believe that Sandstrom,
who was arrested for a traffic offense, would tell the officers
that persons in the home were smoking marijuana.

Accordingly,

there was no reason to believe that the occupants of the home would
destroy evidence before a search warrant could be obtained.
5.

The defendant's home is located at 75 West 400 North,

Huntington, Utah, and the said home is the third house from the
corner.
6.

The search warrant described the place to be searched

as 50 West 400 North, Blacks Trailer Court, Single wide trailer,
second trailer headed West on 400 North on South side of road,
belonging to Devon Potter.
7.

No house numbers were posted on the trailers.

8.

The search warrant did not state the city in which

the house was located.
9.

The house to be searched could not have been ascer-

tained by reference to the Warrant itself because the Warrant did
not describe the premises to be searched with particularity.
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-3Fro the foregoing Findings the Court concludes that the
evidence seized at the home of the defendant should be suppresses
and denied admission into, evidence as trial.
DATED this

/

day of August, 1992.

<3^

DISTRICT COURT/JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of RULING ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS to tfce parties addressed as
follows, postage prepaid, this "l^-*n day of August, 1992:
Patricia Geary
Emery County Attorney
P.O. Box 1099
Castle Dale, Utah 84513
Mart T. Ethington
Attorney at Law
45 E. Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
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APPENDIX II
Search Warrant Affidavit and Warrant

IK THE

J

COURT
COUNTY OF EMERY. STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT FOR
SEARCH WARRANT

vs.

Dei^T&Tfl&e
Defendant^).

STATE OF UTAH
I

)

Criminal No

ss.

Countyf iof Emery j
The affiant undersigned, being duly sworn, states on information and belief:
Description

The property for which a search warrant is sought is described as follows:

of Property:

Uaff. fMU&dt &m (JM 6*&;
,MVS*/s<£ duL
Grounds:

. G T m s unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed.
O Has been used or is possessed for the purpose of being used to commit or conceal the
commission of an offense.
B i s evidence of illegal conduct, to wit:

Location
of Property:

ffa*""*

f^f

I have probable cause to believe, and do believe, said properly b:
ED^n the person of &tff*Ai*t4

B In the vehicle described $$

M&jl
( B i ) n the premises described n

^\ ^

pWttMM

Possession
fry Non-party

O Said property is in the possession of one who is not a party to the alleged illegal
conduct, but
O Cannot be obtained by subpoena because:.

D If sought by subpoena, I believe the property would be concealed, destroyed, damaged
or altered, because:

nighttime

D?i request that a nighttime search be authored.

Search:

EK*believe that a nighttime search is necessary to seize the property prior to its
being concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered because

{**&*£&<-{

ffi^Tha
have other good reason to authorize a nighttimee search, towit:

tL'"•/"'^•^fo?

Information

The information set forth in this affidavit was received by this officer from the (A)

and Source:

informint(s) named below, each of whom stated to this officer that he personalty
perceived the (B) events described (unless otherwise indicated), on the (C) date
shown, and who related the information to this officer on the (D) date shown.

(A) Informant &erA

SA^Jf^b^w^,

(B) information A4 \\>.tt>f>lt\ *«fj/<pl
AlLfdlA

jtjjjt^

Lk^A^rt

Z~jh*A*J{,»vt

fkAAKt^M^jM.

*AffifiJfa

l*fL<4

feSZtlte

pltf,

fa

tl*AP <*L*d*»t2«* YUAAJL**

(C) Date Observed jf/f/ff
(0) Oate Told To Affiant gj/f&jReliablfty

I believe the (A) informant(s) named above to be reliable for these reasons:

of Informant^):

(past experience, declaration against penal interest, citizen informant, etc.)

If any informant is unnamed, t allege I have good reason to withhold his identity, to
protect him and preserve his future usefulness. To reveal his identity would

Verification:

I have verified this information through my own investigation asfollows-J»* U/AAffitA

jtoourttA

Perm vm ZnnCvCrf** 4M4J\AJP , %p <KfiifA*k /jJAtrito/Mu^ve**
No Knock

B i further request I be authorized to execute the search warrant without giving prior
notice of my authority and purpose because:
C f h e property sought b a narcotic or similar substance easily and quickly destroyed
or disposed of.
EHJanger to officer or another may result if notice is given. (Explain)

LK&jfe&w

Date gp»rf- /Q£-Si£-?y
Time Signed: j2£l£L

* " T ^ ^ ^ ^ L ^ J ^

By:

Affiant (Officer)
This Affidavit was sworn to before me fiin person, O by telephone, by Affiant on the date and time shown. If by telephone;,
the affidavit was prepared in duplicate originals, and signed for Affiant, who b known to me, at his request.

'llCrc*<

Magistrate

ORDER
GOOD CAUSE appearing, it b ordered that a search warrant be issued for the articles and places described in the
affidavit, for an immediate search
O in the daytime

D upon notice

Erfnytiffl*. <by or night

BWrithout notice

The affiant named above b further authorized by telephone by the magistrate undersigned to sign the name of the
magistrate to said search warranto
accordance with the affidavit and order.
rarranLf repared in accord;

Date: 2JL
Time:,
*N.

SI

fj„

s

*<A
Magistrate

EMERY COUNTY A T T O R N E Y
P.O. BOX 1099
CASTLE DALE. UTAH 84513
S C O T T N. J O H A N S E N , COUNTY ATTORNEY

TELEPHONE: (801) 3 8 1 * 2 5 4 3

G E N E S T R A T E , DEPUTY

JIM. . i p ^ ^ * ^ ^ ibJe*.*

IN THE

sW72rg

COURT

COUNTY Of EMERY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff.
«i

T)tL\U. Qfo>
Defendants)

)

SEARCH WARRANT

)

D Original

>
)

O Duplicate Origin.!
Criminal No

COUNTY OF EMERY. STATE OF UTAH
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH
J
Proof by affidavit having been made before me this day by
that there is probable cause for issuance of a search warrant, as more fully set forth in the affidavit, a copy of
which is attached hereto and incorporated herein:
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to make an immediate search,
O in the daytime,
EHtaytime, day or night, good cause having been shown by affidavit,
*
ItfoMhe person(s) of

JMpeM*«A

zX -jts, f \ \J+*

ffflto

AAIULAUP

the vehicle(s) described i s

FO'R THE FOLLOWING PROPERTY:

>**4A&sk<9rijA

A&C4rtJs

££w4

and if you find the same or any part thereof, bring it forthwith before me at the
Court and make return as required by Section 77-23-7 U.CA (1953) as amended.

^

*w*/.

You C a r e O are not authorized to execute this warrant without giving prior notice of your authority and
purpose.

Make return within 10 days.

Date: <^///<?/*)?,

,—

yy

Time: / - N ^ f r f o ^ / j ? ^

>
BY:.

Magistrate

Officer

O This warrant was signed by the officer named, for the magistrate at his telephoned request, both parties being
known to each other, with the same force and effect as if signed personally by the magistrate.
^ J t f s warrant was signed by the magistrate personally.

